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ABSTRACT
The strength of obfuscated software has increased over the recent
years. Compiler based obfuscation has become the de facto standard
in the industry and recent papers also show that injection of obfus-
cation techniques is done at the compiler level. In this paper we
discuss a generic approach for deobfuscation and recompilation of
obfuscated code based on the compiler framework LLVM. We show
how binary code can be lifted back into the compiler intermediate
language LLVM-IR and explain how we recover the control flow
graph of an obfuscated binary functionwith an iterative control flow
graph construction algorithm [3] based on compiler optimizations
and satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solving. Our approach
does not make any assumptions about the obfuscated code, but
instead uses strong compiler optimizations available in LLVM and
Souper Optimizer to simplify away the obfuscation. Our experi-
mental results show that this approach can be effective to weaken
or even remove the applied obfuscation techniques like constant
unfolding, certain arithmetic–based opaque expressions, dead code
insertions, bogus control flow or integer encoding found in public
and commercial obfuscators. The recovered LLVM-IR can be further
processed by custom deobfuscation passes that are now applied at
the same level as the injected obfuscation techniques or recompiled
with one of the available LLVM backends. The presented work is
implemented in a deobfuscation tool called SATURN (Figure 1).
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years we observed the increase in popularity and rise of
intermediate language and source–based obfuscators, specifically
due to the growth and diverse landscape of target architectures,
especially on the mobile market [11]. While classical binary–based
obfuscations were previously attacked by applying pattern–based
rules or simple static analysis, higher–level obfuscations applied on
intermediate language or source code cannot be effectively compro-
mised. Modern protection tools are mostly based on state–of–the–
art compiler frameworks like LLVM that allow much more complex
Figure 1: Workflow of the SATURN deobfuscation frame-
work
obfuscation logic [11] [23].
In this paper we present an automatic deobfuscation approach
based on LLVM’s strong code optimizations. The paper focuses on
several aspects that need to be addressed during deobfuscation:
translation of binary code to LLVM-IR, control flow graph recovery,
detection of opaque predicates, deobfuscation, brightening of the re-
covered function and recompilation.
Translating binary code into LLVM-IR is not a straightforward
task. A binary opcode does not only execute the operation itself,
but might also address several other operations like the calculation
of the condition codes/flags that influence later branch instructions.
The information that could be used to translate the binary code
into an intermediate language like the LLVM-IR is normally lost
during compilation and, especially in obfuscated binary code, this
task can be even harder. One approach to target the problem is
to implement the exact semantic of each binary opcode and store
the output into a structure that holds the current state of the reg-
isters. This is a generic approach that lifts the binary code into a
virtualized context but does not make any assumptions about the
binary code itself. The recovered LLVM-IR is fully functional but the
readability of the IR might be very low. In this paper we make use
of Remill [21] [14] to address the problem of binary code translation.
Control flow obfuscation is a technique to hide the original con-
trol flow of a function. To deobfuscate the function the attacker has
to recover the control flow graph from the obfuscated binary code.
Modern obfuscation tools that operate on intermediate languages
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like LLVM-IR have the ability to heavily obfuscate the control flow
graph. We introduce an algorithm that makes use of the State
struct in Remill to recover the edges of each lifted basic block. The
lifted basic blocks and edges represent the recovered control flow
graph. The recovery of the control flow graph is done statically
and automatically during the lifting of the obfuscated binary code.
Compared to previous work ([13], [37], [12], [35], [26]) that was
done on control flow graph recovery, our approach does not need
any prior knowledge about the binary code and doesn’t rely on
traces of the function. Instead, the path exploration is done based on
the partially deobfuscated basic blocks and their predecessors. Our
algorithm is similar to the Iterative Control Flow Graph Construction
in [3] but is superior in the way that it works independently of the
order in which the branches are examined.
A technique to conceal the control flow graph of a function is
the insertion of opaque predicates (OP) to thwart naïve control
flow graph reconstruction algorithms. An opaque predicate is a
conditional branch injected into the control flow graph whose
condition exists to confuse or thwart reverse engineering, but whose
evaluation is deterministic, and thus irrelevant to the greater logic
of the program [7]. We present an effective approach to detect and
remove opaque predicates. The shown approach is based on strong
LLVM and Souper Optimizer optimizations. For opaque predicates
that are resistant to the applied optimizations and/or to verify the
optimization results, we use an approach based on SMT solving.
The way to identify opaque predicates with SMT solving is not new
[19], but we believe that the way we combine several tools and
algorithms are a rich contribution to this paper.
Brightening [COMP.] verb – Reshaping code tomake it more read-
able and understandable for humans
Constant unfolding, arithmetic-based opaque expressions, dead
code, bogus control flow and integer encoding are not only found
in hardened code, but can also appear in non-obfuscated code. Nor-
mally, during compilation of the source code, the compiler detects
this kind of patterns and optimizes them away to obtain the best
possible result. The presented approach relies on the reshaping of
the LLVM-IR, as the way the code gets lifted by Remill might hinder
the optimizer to reach the best result. The needed steps to reshape
the LLVM-IR are generic and don’t rely on any prior knowledge
about the obfuscator.
Without brightening, the LLVM-IR would be fully functional but
in this paper we aim to reach a vanilla1 state representation of the
lifted function. This includes reconstruction of the original function
arguments and transformation of the Remill specific lifted function
based on the State struct (Listing 1) into a clean LLVM function
with its original signature.
Once the control flow graph is recovered and the function is deob-
fuscated, one of the goals of the presented approach is to recompile
and execute the lifted function. Due to the choice of LLVM-IR as
destination language for the lifted binary code, we can easily com-
pile the recovered code back into binary code by using one of the
1As close as possible to a non-obfuscated compiled source code
struct State {
VectorReg vec[kNumVecRegisters];
ArithFlags aflag;
Flags rflag;
Segments seg;
AddressSpace addr;
GPR gpr;
X87Stack st;
MMX mmx;
FPUStatusFlags sw;
XCR0 xcr0;
FPU x87;
SegmentCaches seg_caches;
}
Listing 1: Remill State struct definition for x86_64
available LLVM backends (X86, ARM, AArch64, RISC-V and others).
Our experiments show that we are able to apply our approach
on current state-of-the-art obfuscations and also, to partially defeat
the anti-symbolic deobfuscation tricks introduced in [22].
Our work is not only useful for deobfuscation. In fact this ap-
proach can also be used for further applications like fuzzing, as
input for dynamic symbolic execution (DSE) engines like KLEE [4],
as input for LLVM based obfuscators like O-LLVM [11], to achieve
automatic payload creation for exploitation as shown in [34] or
in general to recompile binary code with the best available CPU
optimizations (-march=native) to improve the performance of ap-
plications or to introduce new compiler based security features.
This applies especially to applications where the source code is not
available.
1.1 Goals and Challenges
Wewant to propose a deobfuscation framework based on LLVM and
its strong optimizations for real world applications. Using LLVM
for reverse engineering might look like an overcomplication in the
beginning, but it’s similar to what is done during the compilation
of source code. The LLVM compiler framework has all the needed
tools to easily create and modify the control flow graph, its basic
blocks and instructions. The challenge is to lift the binary code
into the LLVM-IR and get it into a shape that is equal to a non-
obfuscated compiled source code. The techniques to reach this goal
should be generic, non error-prone and lightweight. The framework
should always generate working LLVM-IR that can be recompiled
and executed. We aim at proposing a framework to lift the binary
code back into a clean and understandable LLVM-IR that is built
on mature tools around the LLVM ecosystem. Our vision is to get
the attack surface back to the level it was implemented at – the
compiler level.
1.2 Contribution
We summarize our contributions as follows.
• We propose an automatic deobfuscation tool that is generic
enough to deal with several obfuscation techniques.
• We propose a framework that can recompile and inject the
LLVM-IR code back into the given binary.
• We propose an effective and efficient method to identify
opaque predicates at the LLVM-IR level, that are then solved
and verified using compiler optimizations and SMT solvers.
• We propose a generic method to transform the binary code
lifted by Remill into a cleaner LLVM-IR without the Remill
State struct. This includes the recovery of the stack and the
function arguments.
• We show that our work can be used to weaken or even re-
move anti-symbolic execution tricks like the ones introduced
in the work of [22] and allows the usage of state-of-the-art
source-level dynamic symbolic execution tools.
• We propose a framework that can generate a compact rep-
resentation of the obfuscated constraints that are easier to
solve or check for satisfiability.
1.3 Discussion
We explore several steps to recover the binary code from an ob-
fuscated binary, based on the lifting of the code to the compiler
intermediate language LLVM-IR. We propose several algorithms
that were implemented in the tool SATURN that help to handle dif-
ferent aspects of binary code deobfuscation. To our knowledge the
implementation of SATURN is state-of-the-art and lifts the attacking
surface from the obfuscated binary code back to the compiler level.
Our work has a high impact on the security of obfuscated binaries
and allows the usage of efficient state-of-the-art source-/IR-level
dynamic symbolic execution tools like KLEE to further analyze the
recovered code. We provide an experimental setup that includes
several corner cases that might hinder binary code lifting, but also
apply our method to strong obfuscated real world binaries.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 LLVM
"LLVM began as a research project at the University of Illinois, with
the goal of providing a modern, SSA-based compilation strategy
[33] capable of supporting both static and dynamic compilation of
arbitrary programming languages. Since then, LLVM has grown
to be an umbrella project consisting of a number of sub-projects,
many of which are being used in production by a wide variety of
commercial and open source projects as well as being widely used
in academic research" [16]. To understand our approach it’s not
crucial to understand how LLVM and its internal language LLVM-IR
are designed, but the reader should keep in mind that the LLVM-IR
is based on the Static Single Assignment form (SSA) [8] which
makes it easier to construct the final formula passed to the SMT
solver [34].
2.2 Remill
"Remill is a static binary translator that translates machine code
instructions into LLVM bitcode. It translates x86 and amd64 ma-
chine code (including AVX and AVX512) into the LLVM-IR" [21]. In
our work we make extensive use of Remill to lift the binary code
into the LLVM-IR. Remill does not make any assumptions about the
stack or the arguments of a lifted function since it only lifts single
instructions.
2.3 Souper optimizer
Souper is particularly convenient because it’s an LLVM-based project
that, with the help of KLEE [4], is capable of converting a sequence
of LLVM-IR instructions into an SMT formula and use several SMT
solvers to discover additional peephole optimizations. As a desired
side-effect we can benefit from its results to determine the opaque-
ness of a conditional branch. Souper has the possibility to cache
the SMT queries and results into an external Redis database [24]
to improve the performance. This leaves us with a database full of
opaque predicates and obfuscation patterns that could be analyzed
in further studies.
2.4 KLEE
"KLEE is a symbolic execution tool capable of automatically generat-
ing tests that achieve high coverage on a diverse set of complex and
environmentally-intensive programs and operates on the LLVM-
IR" [4]. KLEE is not only a useful tool for testing software but it’s
also very effective in attacking several code obfuscation techniques.
Current work proposed in [22] tries to hinder symbolic execution
tools like KLEE to do their work effectively.
3 MOTIVATION
3.1 Attacker model
Goal.We consider a man-at-the-end (MATE) scenario where the
attacker has full access to a protected binary under attack and no
access to the source code or unprotected binary. The attack model
and the methodology follow closely the survey by Schrittweiser et
al. [28] and are similar to the ones considered in [22]. To be more
concrete, we will focus on the following goals: 1. Recovery of the con-
trol flow graph. Retrieving the control flow graph of an obfuscated
function is a crucial step to understand what the original function
performs. 2. Detection of opaque predicates. Recovery of the control
flow graph can only be successful if the injected opaque predicates
can be detected and removed. 3. Deobfuscation of several obfusca-
tion techniques. To make the code readable and understandable
the injected obfuscation patterns have to be detected and removed.
4. Recovery of the stack and arguments. If the attacker can rebuild
the stack and arguments, the code of the function will become tidy.
5. Execution of the recovered code. If the attacker is able to execute a
semantically equivalent deobfuscated code, further analysis can be
done with tools like a debugger if needed.
3.2 Motivating example
Let us illustrate some anti-symbolic path-oriented protections on
a toy program like those introduced in the work of [22]. Listing 2
displays an unoptimized obfuscation of a simple toy example that
is protected against symbolic execution attacks with the FOR and
SPLIT tricks as introduced in [22] and extended with an opaque
predicate to protect the final calculation.
int func(char chr, char ch1, char ch2) {
char garb = 0; char ch = 0;
// FOR trick
for (int i = 0; i < chr; i++)
ch++;
// SPLIT trick
if (ch1 > 60)
garb++;
else
garb--;
if (ch2 > 20)
garb++;
else
garb--;
// MBA based opaque predicate
if ((chr + ch2) == ((chr ^ ch2) + 2 * (chr & ch2)))
ch ^= 97;
else
ch ^= 23;
return (ch == 31);
}
Listing 2: Anti-symbolic path-oriented protections FOR and
SPLIT applied on a toy program based on [22]
define dso_local i32 @func(i8 signext) local_unnamed_addr #0 {
%2 = icmp eq i8 %0, 126
%3 = zext i1 %2 to i32
ret i32 %3
}
Listing 3: Unprotected toy program compiled to LLVM-IR
The anti-symbolic tricks that we considered are not resistant to
compiler optimizations and can easily be removed by compiling
the code with clang -O3 optimization. The introduced opaque
predicate is resistant to compiler optimizations and can only be
recovered by SMT solving. In our tests we will compile the toy
example with clang -O0 to hinder the optimizer from optimizing
away the introduced tricks. The output binary therefore contains
several stack slots, that are required to be recovered during the
brightening step. If we fail to recover the stack slots and arguments,
the LLVM optimizations will fail to work and the anti-symbolic
tricks won’t be removed. If we succeed, the retrieved LLVM-IR
should look similar to the output of clang -O3 -S -emit-llvm in
Listing 3 applied on the toy program without any obfuscation.
4 FUNCTION RECOVERY
Two of the core features of SATURN are the exploration and control
flow graph reconstruction phases. The LLVM ecosystem relies on
powerful and correct algorithms that we made use of during the
development of SATURN ’s passes. In this section we explain how
SATURN achieves full function recovery starting from the binary
code.
4.1 Code lifting to LLVM-IR
SATURN heavily relies on Remill. That’s why it’s important to
understand how Remill is lifting a native instruction to LLVM-IR.
Remill makes use of the target architecture’s CPU instruction se-
mantics to lift an instruction. In Listing 1 we can see the State
struct for the x86_64 architecture.
To emulate an x86_64 instruction like add rax, rcx Remill will
create a call to a helper function that implements the emulation
for the instruction. This function takes the State variable as an
argument (Listing 4) and calculates the result according to the
semantic of the instruction. This also includes the Flags registers.
Once all instructions of a basic block are lifted, the generated calls
get inlined into the caller. The output LLVM-IR is not very readable
at this step, but it behaves functionally the same as the native
counterpart.
Memory *__remill_basic_block(State &state, addr_t curr_pc, Memory *
↪→ memory);
Listing 4: Remill basic block function signature C/C++
During the lifting, SATURN stores each recovered basic block
into its own LLVM-IR function. The basic block functions then get
connected in a separate LLVM-IR function, which is representing
the recovered control flow graph (Figure 2).
Figure 2: LLVM function that contains the control flow
graph of the recovered function at address 1000. The ba-
sic blocks are lifted as LLVM functions themselves and get
called according to their usage. The result of the call decides
the destination of the branch.
With this design decision we can directly optimize the lifted
basic block function and achieve a performance improvement in
further deobfuscation steps. Applying optimizations at this step
also removes some simple obfuscation patterns. The control flow
function is kept as simple as possible, which allows us to add/re-
move edges without the need to change the lifted code and avoids
dealing with LLVM’s PHI -nodes [33].
SATURN decides how to proceed with the path exploration dur-
ing the lifting of basic blocks. For that SATURN is using the Remill
instruction categories that are generated for each lifted instruction.
Based on the instruction category SATURN will try to detect if the
basic block is ending with an opaque predicate (Table 1) or not. If
the basic block is a candidate for an opaque predicate, SATURN
will first try to prove the outgoing edges by applying LLVM’s op-
timization passes. If after optimization the count of the outgoing
edges is greater than one, SATURN will try to solve the outgoing
edges by making use of Souper and the Z3 SMT solver [9]. SATURN
is always trying to use LLVM’s optimizations first, since they are
much cheaper, performance-wise, compared to the use of an SMT
solver. Our tests with various obfuscation engines show that most
of the generated opaque predicates are not resistant to LLVM’s
optimizations. The handling of opaque predicates is well described
in Section 5.
Table 1: Path Exploration
kCategory Exploration Opaqueness Proof
NoOp Continue No
Normal Continue No
FunctionReturn Stop Yes
IndirectJump Stop Yes
DirectJump Stop No
ConditionalBranch Stop Yes
IndirectFunctionCall Stop Yes
DirectFunctionCall Continue No
SATURN continues with the lifting process as long as new edges
are discovered. When SATURN is discovering a new incoming edge
for a basic block, it has to prove that the new edge does not change
the opaqueness of an already (temporarily) proven basic block
(Table 1). The following steps are applied:
(1) create a new function, called FSlice, based on the definition
in Listing 4
(2) find all the basic blocks that dominate the lifted basic block,
that we identify as BBLift
(3) if more than one predecessor is found, stop and continue at
step 5
(4) repeat step 2 - 3 with the predecessor as input and store the
result in a sorted list, called PSort, based on the dominance
(5) for each predecessor in PSort create a call in FSlice in re-
verse order
(6) connect the called predecessors with a branch instruction
(7) call BBLift at the end of FSlice and connect it to the called
dominating predecessor with a branch
(8) inline all calls in FSlice and apply the LLVM optimizations.
Now SATURN is using one of the solutions explained in Sec-
tion 5.3 to determine the opaqueness of the basic block.
The basic block opaqueness might change to non-opaque and
help us to detect false positives. This step is important, as it guides
further code exploration. We also need this step because we can’t
know about all the incoming edges in the beginning and we gain
the needed knowledge about the control flow graph only during the
exploration phase. The opaqueness of the basic block will change
according to Table 2.
Table 2: Basic Block Opaqueness
Current Opaqueness New Edge New Opaqueness
No OP No OP No OP
No OP OP No OP
OP No OP No OP
OP OP OP
5 DEOBFUSCATION BY OPTIMIZATION
The capability to easily build custom optimization passes is part
of the core design of LLVM. In this section we are going to cover
the custom optimization passes that we implemented to facilitate
the propagation of constants and the identification of opaque pred-
icates.
5.1 Constants
Storing constants in data sections is a common obfuscation tech-
nique to trick disassemblers like IDA Pro [10] into generating wrong
results or simply stop the disassembling of the function. During
deobfuscation, SATURN tries to detect accesses to such constants
and replace the read instruction with a constant value in the LLVM-
IR. Demoting the global variables helps the LLVM optimization
passes to apply constant folding and defeat such kind of obfusca-
tion tricks. The user has to supply the ranges where to look for such
constant data with the SATURN option constantPool. Our tests with
several obfuscators show that it’s not enough to use the constant
binary data sections. In the obfuscators we looked at, we could find
sections with read/write attributes that contained such constants.
5.2 Stack pointer aliasing
Remill does not know about the concept of a stack. Instead of trying
to emulate the stack, it handles the stack operations by using read
and write intrinsics (Listing 5) relying on the stack register as
address. The stack register is part of the State struct and is defined
as an unsigned integer value like uint64_t State.gpr.rsp.qword
for the x86_64 architecture. In SATURN the access to the stack will
be represented as a load/store of an IntToPtr value. This makes it
impossible for LLVM to apply pointer aliasing, because LLVM does
not support pointer aliasing on integer values [17].
In SATURN this problem is handled by concretizing the stack
register in the function representing the control flow graph. We
then inline the basic block functions and optimize the code. During
uint<T>_t __remill_read_memory_<T>(Memory *, addr_t);
Memory *__remill_write_memory_<T>(Memory *, addr_t, uint<T>_t);
Listing 5: Remill’s memory read and write intrinsics
definition
optimization the concrete stack register value will be propagated
through the LLVM-IR and will replace the IntToPtr operand with
a concrete memory location. This concrete value helps us to iden-
tify the stack slot. We then create a global variable and a LLVM-IR
Alloca instruction for the stack slot at the beginning of the control
flow graph function. After that we load the value from the global
variable and store it into the Alloca value right after the Alloca
instruction. We keep a map of known stack slots, their global vari-
ables and of the generated Alloca instructions. We optimize the
code again and now, based on the allocas, LLVM is able to apply a
proper pointer aliasing pass. These steps may reveal new concrete
stack slots and we repeat this algorithm until no new stack slots are
detected. Once it’s finished we remove the unused global variables.
After the algorithm is done, some global variables are not op-
timized away. These global variables represent the return value,
the function arguments passed on the stack and the values popped
from the stack and stored in the execution context by the function.
This is a side effect that we can use in the further two deobfuscation
steps code brightening and recovering of the function arguments.
Pointer aliasing on the stack is an important feature for deob-
fuscation. It’s crucial that this step gives accurate results, since it’s
needed for the following optimization steps.
0x146253057: lea rsp, [rsp-8]
0x14625305F: push rcx
0x146253060: xchg rcx, [rsp+8]
0x146253065: mov rcx, r14
0x146253068: mov [rsp+8], rcx
0x14625306D: mov rcx, [rsp]
0x146253071: mov [rsp], r14
0x146253075: push rcx
0x146253076: lea rcx, [rsp+8]
0x14625307B: not r14
0x14625307E: xor r14, [rcx]
0x146253081: pop rcx
0x146253082: push rbx
0x146253083: mov ebx, 0xD4469D6E
0x146253088: push rsi
0x146253089: mov esi, 0xB7E07B2A
0x14625308E: add esi, ebx
0x146253090: mov ebx, esi
0x146253092: xor ebx, 0x533C089A
0x146253098: mov esi, 0xAB832EC0
0x14625309D: ror ebx, 0x14
0x1462530A0: and esi, 0x5B171CFB
0x1462530A6: rcl ebx, 0x1E
0x1462530A9: or ebx, 0xE4E97533
0x1462530AF: shld esi, ebx, 6
0x1462530B3: rcl ebx, 0xD
0x1462530B6: jb 0x1465C8B69
Listing 6: Obfuscated x86_64 opaque predicate
5.3 Breaking Opaque Predicates with LLVM-IR
Optimizations
SATURN is approaching the opaque predicates problem in two steps.
First it creates a slice of the instruction pointer and then applies
LLVM optimizations on it. If the optimization is successful, the slice
will fold into a single concrete value.
The available open source slicers ([38][5][29]) seem to be too
outdated or unreliable to produce a valid slice for a given function.
Conversely, our algorithm is based on modelling the slicing process
in C and then relying on the LLVM optimizations to produce the
slice.
5.3.1 SATURN’s slicing. The Remill’s basic block definition in List-
ing 4 contains the information to control and inspect the value of a
general purpose register before and after the execution of a Remill
function. Based on the Remill basic block, the slicing is achieved
with the following steps:
(1) initialize a Remill State struct with a symbolic state
(2) concretize the initial instruction pointer (RIP)
(3) call the opaque basic block, that has been previously opti-
mized with the constant promotion and stack aliasing passes.
This call is inlined during further optimization
(4) pass the initialized State struct to the basic block to be
proven to be opaque
(5) get the resulting State struct after the basic block execution,
specifically inspecting the final instruction pointer.
extern "C" uint64_t __saturn_slice_rip(State state, addr_t curr_pc,
↪→ Memory *memory, uint64_t *Stack) {
// 1 Allocate a local Remill State structure and initialize it
State S;
S.gpr.rax.qword = state.gpr.rax.qword;
...
S.gpr.rsp.qword = (uint64_t) Stack;
S.gpr.r15.qword = state.gpr.r15.qword;
S.aflag.af = state.aflag.af;
...
S.aflag.zf = state.aflag.zf;
// 2 Concretize RIP
S.gpr.rip.qword = curr_pc;
// 3/4 Call opaque basic block with initialized State struct
// This function call will be replaced with the lifted one
__remill_basic_block(S, curr_pc, memory);
// 5 Inspect the value of RIP
return S.gpr.rip.qword;
}
Listing 7: SATURN ’s slicing helper function
The initialization and further inspection steps are in Listing 7.
The final step is taking the generated __saturn_slice_rip function
and applying LLVM optimizations on it. If the function implements
an opaque predicate and LLVM is able to optimize it away, the func-
tion will end with a concrete return value. This is the deterministic
instruction pointer address where the basic block will continue.
Listing 6 is showing an example of the obfuscated opaque predicate.
In Listing 8 we can appreciate the result of the previously described
process. The opaqueness has been broken and the unique destina-
tion address recovered.
SATURN has two options to control the amount of basic blocks
to be used while slicing the value of the instruction pointer. This is
needed as some obfuscators reuse values from previous basic blocks
in subsequent opaque predicates. The SATURN options solverBB-
CountJcc and solverBBCountReturn let the user specify the amount
of basic blocks with a single predecessor to connect to the current
opaque block before optimizing it.
define dso_local i64 @__saturn_slice_rip(%struct.State*, i64, %
↪→ struct.Memory*, i64*) {
entry:
ret i64 5475437417 ; 0x1465C8B69
}
Listing 8: Sliced and optimized LLVM-IR with recovered
Opaque Predicate offset 0x1465C8B69
In the next section we approach the problem of hard to opti-
mize opaque predicates, most commonly based on Mixed-Boolean-
Arithmetic (MBA [3]) expressions, as seen in our motivating exam-
ple in Listing 2.
5.4 Solving Opaque Predicates with Souper and
Z3
The previous approach might fail because LLVM’s optimizations
are not successful in reducing the sliced instruction pointer to a
constant. This means the conditional branch is either based on a
stronger opaque predicate or might be a real conditional branch. To
further analyze the branch we use the Souper Optimizer [27] and a
SMT solver. The steps taken to prove the opaqueness with the Z3
theorem prover integrated within Souper are the following:
(1) extract the sliced instruction pointer value from the opaque
basic block (Value %17 in Listing 9)
(2) collect a set of candidate expressions to be solved by Souper
(3) select the Souper expression corresponding to the sliced
instruction pointer value from the set
(4) build an SMT query that aims at finding one valid solution
for the sliced instruction pointer expression
(5) if the query is not satisfiable, something went wrong in the
proving process and the pass fails
(6) if the query is satisfiable, a valid solution for the expression
has been discovered and a second SMT query is built to
determine if the unique solution has been found, as shown
in Listing 10
(7) if the last query is satisfiable, the conditional branch has
been proven to be opaque and the real destination has been
determined
(8) if the last query is not satisfiable, a real conditional branch
or an opaque predicate which is not provable by the SMT
solver has been found.
define i64 @__saturn_slice_rip(%struct.State.32* %state, i64 %
↪→ curr_pc, %struct.Memory* %memory, i64* %Stack) #2 {
entry:
%0 = getelementptr inbounds %struct.State.32, %struct.State.32* %
↪→ state, i64 0, i32 6, i32 17, i32 0, i32 0
%1 = load i64, i64* %0, align 8, !tbaa !9
%2 = getelementptr inbounds %struct.State.32, %struct.State.32* %
↪→ state, i64 0, i32 6, i32 19, i32 0, i32 0
%3 = load i64, i64* %2, align 8, !tbaa !9
%4 = shl i64 %1, 56
%5 = ashr exact i64 %4, 56
%6 = add i64 %5, %3
%7 = xor i64 %3, %1
%8 = shl i64 %7, 56
%9 = ashr exact i64 %8, 56
%10 = and i64 %3, %1
%11 = shl i64 %10, 56
%12 = ashr exact i64 %11, 55
%13 = add nsw i64 %12, %9
%14 = trunc i64 %6 to i32
%15 = trunc i64 %13 to i32
%16 = icmp eq i32 %14, %15
%17 = select i1 %16, i64 5368713261, i64 5368713259
ret i64 %17
}
Listing 9: Sliced MBA of the toy program
(set-logic QF_BV )
(declare-fun arr () (_ BitVec 8) )
(declare-fun arr0 () (_ BitVec 8) )
(assert (let ( (?B1 arr0 ) (?B2 arr ) ) (let ( (?B3 ((_ sign_extend
↪→ 24) ?B1 ) ) (?B4 ((_ sign_extend 24) ?B2 ) ) (?B5 (bvand ?
↪→ B2 ?B1 ) ) (?B6 (bvxor ?B2 ?B1 ) ) ) (let ( (?B11 ((_
↪→ sign_extend 24) ?B6 ) ) (?B10 ((_ sign_extend 24) ?B5 ) )
↪→ (?B8 (bvadd ?B4 ?B3 ) ) (?B9 (bvashr ?B4 (_ bv31 32) ) ) (?
↪→ B7 (bvashr ?B3 (_ bv31 32) ) ) ) (let ( (?B14 ((_ extract 0
↪→ 0) ?B9 ) ) (?B12 ((_ extract 0 0) ?B7 ) ) (?B15 (bvshl ?
↪→ B10 (_ bv1 32) ) ) (?B13 (bvashr ?B8 (_ bv31 32) ) ) (?B16
↪→ (bvashr ?B11 (_ bv31 32) ) ) ) (let ( (?B17 ((_ extract 0
↪→ 0) ?B13 ) ) (?B22 ((_ extract 0 0) ?B16 ) ) (?B19 (bvadd ?
↪→ B15 ?B11 ) ) (?B20 (bvashr ?B15 (_ bv31 32) ) ) (?B21 (
↪→ bvashr ?B15 (_ bv1 32) ) ) (?B18 (= ?B14 ?B12 ) ) ) (let (
↪→ (?B27 ((_ extract 0 0) ?B20 ) ) (?B25 (bvashr ?B19 (_ bv31
↪→ 32) ) ) (?B23 (= ?B17 ?B14 ) ) (?B28 (= ?B21 ?B10 ) ) (?B24
↪→ (= false ?B18 ) ) (?B26 (= ?B19 ?B8 ) ) ) (let ( (?B31 (
↪→ ite ?B26 (_ bv5368713423 64) (_ bv5368713442 64) ) ) (?B30
↪→ ((_ extract 0 0) ?B25 ) ) (?B29 (or ?B24 ?B23 ) ) (?B32 (=
↪→ ?B27 ?B22 ) ) ) (let ( (?B35 (= false ?B32 ) ) (?B33 (= ?
↪→ B30 ?B27 ) ) (?B34 (= (_ bv5368713423 64) ?B31 ) ) ) (let (
↪→ (?B36 (or ?B35 ?B33 ) ) ) (let ( (?B37 (and ?B36 ?B28 ) )
↪→ ) (let ( (?B38 (and ?B37 ?B29 ) ) ) (let ( (?B39 (= false ?
↪→ B38 ) ) ) (let ( (?B40 (or ?B39 ?B34 ) ) ) (and ?B38 (=
↪→ false ?B34 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
(check-sat)
(exit)
Listing 10: Z3 SMT query to solve theMBA opaque predicate
from the toy program in Listing 2
6 RECOMPILATION
SATURN is not only lifting and deobfuscating the code, one of
the goals is also to be able to recompile the LLVM-IR and make it
executable. In this section we explain how SATURN is preparing
the code for recompilation and how it achieves vanilla–like results.
6.1 Post Translation Optimization
Once the obfuscated function is recovered, SATURN starts the post
translation optimization phase, where the input is the control flow
graph function shown in Figure 2. The steps are as follows:
(1) the stack register (RSP) and the instruction pointer register
(RIP) contained in the State variable are concretized
(2) allocas are created for the flag calculation and stored into the
State struct. This helps to optimize and remove unneeded
flag calculations
(3) the basic block functions are inlined like seen in Figure 2
(4) the LLVM optimizations are applied to the function
(5) the constant promotion algorithm (Section 5.1) and the stack
alias analysis (Section 5.2) are applied to the function
(6) the steps 2–4 are repeated until no further changes are de-
tected.
After the post translation is done, the output LLVM-IR is in a
deobfuscated state but it’s still difficult to understand the code
because of the operations applied on the Remill State struct like
shown in Listing 11. At this point the concretization of the registers
can be removed and the LLVM-IR can be compiled to binary code
by making use of one of LLVM’s backends. In the tests we use Clang
to compile the output LLVM-IR into a shared object. SATURN has
two options to recompile the LLVM-IR:
• the first option keeps the lifted function with the Remill
signature as defined in Listing 4. The created C++ helper
functions do the context switch from the x86_64 to the virtual
context and take care of the State struct handling;
• the second option recovers the original function arguments
and removes the State struct. This method has the benefit
that the function can be called directly without a context
switch. This approach is detailed in Section 6.2.
6.2 Code Brightening
The function lifted by Remill is operating on a virtual context (List-
ing 11), the State struct. This hinders the optimizer from detecting
some optimization opportunities, as it has to store the results for
each register back to the State struct. This happens for all the reg-
isters shown in Listing 11. At this point the output code is still
too difficult to understand in further analysis steps like reverse
engineering. In this section we address this problem and show how
the original signature of the function can be reconstructed. This in-
cludes recovering the function arguments and removing the State
struct, which leads to vanilla–like results.
6.2.1 Function Arguments. Based on the algorithm in Section 5.2,
the arguments of a lifted function that are passed through the stack,
are detected by inspecting the remaining global variables. During
the execution of the algorithm in Section 5.2, SATURN keeps track of
the global variables and their stack offsets. This information will be
used to detect the number of arguments, with the knowledge about
the application binary interface (ABI) and the calling convention
[18] used by the function. If no stack arguments are passed to the
function, we detect the number of arguments through the register
accesses on the State struct. We only focus on the reconstruction
of the general purpose registers in the following steps:
define dllexport i64 @F_140001000(%struct.State.32* %S, i64 %curr_pc,
↪→ %struct.Memory.0* %memory) {
entry:
%0 = getelementptr inbounds %struct.State.32, %struct.State.32* %S,
↪→ i64 0, i32 6, i32 33, i32 0, i32 0
%1 = getelementptr inbounds %struct.State.32, %struct.State.32* %S,
↪→ i64 0, i32 13
store i8 0, i8* %1, align 1
%2 = getelementptr inbounds %struct.State.32, %struct.State.32* %S,
↪→ i64 0, i32 6, i32 5, i32 0
%3 = bitcast %union.anon.2* %2 to i8*
%4 = getelementptr inbounds %struct.State.32, %struct.State.32* %S,
↪→ i64 0, i32 6, i32 17, i32 0
%5 = bitcast %union.anon.2* %4 to i8*
%6 = load i8, i8* %5, align 1
%7 = load i8, i8* %3, align 1
store i64 5368713251, i64* %0, align 8
%8 = sext i8 %7 to i64
%phitmp = icmp eq i8 %7, 126
%9 = getelementptr inbounds %struct.State.32, %struct.State.32* %S,
↪→ i64 0, i32 6, i32 1, i32 0, i32 0
%10 = getelementptr inbounds %struct.State.32, %struct.State.32* %
↪→ S, i64 0, i32 6, i32 5, i32 0, i32 0
%11 = sext i8 %6 to i64
%12 = and i64 %11, 4294967295
store i64 5368713372, i64* %0, align 8
%13 = getelementptr inbounds %struct.State.32, %struct.State.32* %
↪→ S, i64 0, i32 6, i32 7, i32 0, i32 0
%14 = xor i8 %7, %6
%15 = sext i8 %14 to i64
%16 = getelementptr inbounds %struct.State.32, %struct.State.32* %
↪→ S, i64 0, i32 6, i32 17, i32 0, i32 0
store i64 %12, i64* %16, align 8
%17 = and i64 %12, %8
%18 = shl nuw nsw i64 %17, 1
%19 = and i64 %18, 4294967294
store i64 %19, i64* %13, align 8
%20 = add nsw i64 %18, %15
%21 = and i64 %20, 4294967295
store i64 %21, i64* %10, align 8
store i8 0, i8* %1, align 1
%22 = zext i1 %phitmp to i8
store i8 %22, i8* %3, align 1
%23 = zext i1 %phitmp to i64
store i64 %23, i64* %9, align 8
ret i64 %23
}
Listing 11: Recovered toy program LLVM-IR in the Remill
State struct form
(1) based on the function’s calling convention, start with the last
register argument in the function’s [18] argument list and
search for the first getElementPtr (GEP) instruction that’s
accessing the register and is also dominating all the other
GEP instructions that access that register
(2) if no GEP instruction is found, continue with the next regis-
ter and decrease the number of arguments by one
(3) if a GEP instruction was found, forward slice the GEP value
to get a tree of users that have a reference to the GEP in-
struction
(4) sort the users based on their position in the dominance tree
DT of the function
(5) look for load and store instructions to detect how the GEP
is used
(6) if a dominating load or store can be found, assume that this
register is an argument
(7) else decrease the number of arguments by one and continue
at step 3.
6.2.2 Function reconstruction. Based on the recovered number of
arguments we start to rebuild the lifted function to be detached
from the State struct. We use helper functions in C/C++ that assist
us to easily map the function arguments to their slots in the State
struct as shown in Listing 12.
extern "C" Memory * F_Lifted(State &state, addr_t curr_pc, Memory *
↪→ memory);
extern "C" uint64_t x64_MS_2_ARG(uint64_t *RCX, uint64_t *RDX) {
struct State S;
// Set 1. arg
S.gpr.rcx.qword = (uint64_t) RCX;
// Set 2. arg
S.gpr.rdx.qword = (uint64_t) RDX;
// Call lifted function which will be replaced and inlined
F_Lifted(S, 0, nullptr);
// Return result
return S.gpr.rax.qword;
}
Listing 12: SATURN ’s helper C/C++ function to handle a
Windows 64-bit ABI function with 2 arguments
We only need to prepare helpers for the register based arguments.
On functions that pass arguments on the stack we can simply add
new arguments to the helper function in the LLVM-IR and replace all
the references of the global value representing the stack argument
to the newly created function argument. The further steps are
independent from the number of arguments:
(1) find the call to the F_Lifted dummy function
(2) replace the reference of F_Lifted to the lifted function
(3) inline the call into the helper function
(4) run LLVM’s strongest optimizations.
Based on LLVM’s optimizations we get a clean LLVM-IR function
that looks vanilla–like as shown in Listing 13. If we compare the
input LLVM-IR in Listing 11 and the result in Listing 13, we can see
how strong and effective the LLVM optimizations are.
define dllexport i64 @F_140001000_args(i64* %RCX, i64* %RDX, i64* %
↪→ R8) {
entry:
%0 = ptrtoint i64* %RCX to i64
%1 = trunc i64 %0 to i8
%2 = icmp eq i8 %1, 126
%3 = zext i1 %2 to i64
ret i64 %3
}
Listing 13: Optimized MBA LLVM-IR function with
recovered arguments
7 EXECUTION
SATURN is not only able to lift, deobfuscate and brighten the code.
It’s also able to inject the deobfuscated function back into the input
binary. Based on the recovery result (with or without State struct)
there are two different ways to call the recovered function.
In both described ways the shared library gets injected into the
input binary. In portable executable (PE) files the import table gets
replaced with an updated import table that contains an import to a
function in our shared library from Section 6.
7.1 Direct Function Redirection
When SATURN is able to fully recover the function and its argu-
ments, we can choose to patch the original function and insert a
branch instruction to the imported symbol.
7.2 Context Switch
If the recovery of the function arguments fails, SATURN is able to
keep the State struct in the recovered function. This approach needs
a more advanced way to execute the function. The needed runtime
is implemented in C++ and x86_64 assembly. The runtime will
be compiled into the shared library that is generated in Section 6.
The needed steps to call the function are:
(1) patch an instruction at the beginning of the obfuscated func-
tion to push one integer value on the stack (used as function
identifier)
(2) patch a second instruction to jump into our imported symbol
in the import table.
When the function is reached during execution, it will jump into
our runtime that does the following:
(1) create a virtual stack and use it in place of the original one
(2) store all the register values into a local State struct
(3) call the lifted function with the generated State struct
(4) on calls/jumps outside of the lifted function restore the reg-
isters from the State struct and handle the return of the
function
(5) if the function returns, restore the registers and jump back
to the caller.
8 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The experiments below seek to answer the following Research
Questions:
RQ1 What is the effectiveness on the recovery of the control flow
graph?
RQ2 What is the detection rate of the opaque predicates?
RQ3 What is the effectiveness of the deobfuscation?
RQ4 Were all arguments and stack slots recovered?
RQ5 Is the deobfuscated code semantically equivalent to the pro-
tected one during execution?
8.1 Experimental setup
The attacker has access to SATURN to reverse engineer the given
binaries and has the goal to recover the obfuscated functions. For
the defense we created some binaries that trigger corner cases and
Table 3: Results for datasets
Dataset #1
Program Time
to lift
Time to
opti-
mize
Detected
Opaque
Predi-
cates
Test
passed
Arguments
recovered
(Lift./Orig.)
Stack
Slots re-
covered
Processed
Instruc-
tions
Recovered
Basic
Blocks
Obfuscation
removed
Solving time
with KLEE
(Lift./Orig.)
Size re-
duction
in Basic
Blocks
args 0.541s 0.980s 0/0a Yesa 0/6a 0a 110 13/13 Yes - 4
cmp_test 0.408s 0.342s 1/1 Yes 2/2 7 39 8/8 Yes - 5
edges 0.129s 0.233s 2/2 Yes 1/1 5 16 4/4 Yes - 3
edges2 0.428s 0.622s 0/0 Yes 2/3d 11 120 10/10 Yes - 9
fib 0.309s 0.287s 0/0 Yes 1/1 6 31 4/4 Yes - 0
gotos 0.599s 0.564s 3/3 Yes 3/3 10 85 13/13 Yes - 10
inf_loop 0.215s 0.285s 1/1 Yes 1/1 0 18 2/2 Yes - 0
loop 0.152s 0.247s 0/0 Yes 1/1 5 21 4/4 Yes - 3
multiedges 0.405s 0.251s 0/0 Yes 1/1 4 21 9/9 Yes - 8
op1 0.188s 0.010s 1/1 Yes 2/2 5 24 3/3 Partiallye - 2
tig_virt 2.337s 1.018s 0/0 Yes 1/1 17 288 41/41 No - 23
sse2 0.147s 0.429s 0/0 Yes 2/2 16 47 1/1 Yesf - 0
Dataset #2
binsec0 4.785s 1.144s 0/0 Yes 1/1 19 226 25/25 Yes 0.43s/2m6.30s 9
binsec0_virt 6.062s 0.595s 0/0 Yesa 0/2 0a 464 86/86 No - 36
binsec1 4.778s 0.141s 0/0 Yesa 0/2 0a 273 27/27 Yes - 3
forsplit 3.033s 0.738s 0/0 Yes 3/3 8 112 12/12 Yes 0.08s/16.13s 4
Dataset #3
obf0_virt 27.998s 8.592s 0/0 Nob 4/? 27 2059 10/?c Yes - 4
obf1_func0 0.754s 0.680s 11/11 Nob 0/0 10 182 12/12 Yes - 10
obf1_func1 1.060s 0.827s 0/0 Nob 0/0 9 241 14/14 Yes - 13
aRemill State struct was used bBinary execution failed because of other protections like anti-tampering
cUnknown amount of original basic blocks dDead argument was detected eMBA formula was not optimized away f Recovered integer arithmetic
use several obfuscation techniques that might hinder binary lifting.
Some binaries are protected by Tigress [30], an open source state–
of–the–art obfuscator. Some other binaries are protected by real
world obfuscators where no source code is available. The machine
for the experiments uses Windows 10 Pro x64 on a Intel Core i7–
6700k CPU with 32 GB RAM.
8.2 Datasets
We select some small programs that trigger corner cases in several
steps of the approach described in this paper. We also choose pro-
grams that contain selected obfuscation patterns and real world
obfuscated binaries where no source code is available. The datasets
and results are available in our online repository 2.
Dataset #1. During the development of SATURN we created
several test samples that can trigger corner cases. The tests include
scenarios like overlapping stack slots, register and stack based argu-
ments, loops, infinite loops, opaque predicates, MBA based opaque
predicates and dead code. The programs take an input value from
the command line, perform some calculations and print the output
to the user. The sample tigress_virtualize is protected with the ti-
gress virtualization obfuscation pass (–Transform=Virtualize).
Dataset #2. This dataset includes some programs that were
taken from the repository provided by [22] and use the SPLIT and
2https://github.com/pgarba/Saturn_Results
FOR anti–DSE tricks.
Dataset #3. The last dataset contains two real world binaries
that were protected with Obfuscator0 and Obfuscator1 3. The binary
from Obfuscator1 was chosen because we have an unprotected
binary and can easily compare the results. The Obfuscator0 doesn’t
have an associated unprotected binary, but we choose it because
it’s a strong obfuscated real world example of a protected virtual
machine entry point4. Both binaries are heavily obfuscated and
were chosen to stress test SATURN.
8.3 Results & Observations
Table 3 shows the results for each tested program in the dataset. In
programs for which the argument and stack recovery fails a , we
are still able to recover the function by staying in the Remill State
struct (RQ1). For all other programs the recovery of the arguments
and the stack was successful (RQ4). In the programs obf0_func0
and obf1_func0 we don’t know the exact amount of opaque predi-
cates but based on the obfuscator we know that a missed opaque
predicate would lead to a broken LLVM-IR. For the programs in
dataset #1 and #2 all opaque predicates are detected (RQ2).
For each program we verified the deobfuscated function for
correctness by comparing the output values to the one of the obfus-
cated program. Programs protected with the Tigress virtualization
3Obfuscator0 and Obfuscator1 are made up names
4Context switch from the original x86_64 to the virtual context
stay in the virtualized form but the recovered code is clean and
readable. The program op1 is only partially deobfuscated. TheMBA
based opaque predicate is removed but the recovered calculation is
still based on the MBA formula e . The result of obf0_virt can’t be
verified but the recovered code is clean, readable and meaningful
(RQ3). For the programs in dataset #2 we are not able to remove
the FOR and SPLIT tricks in the Tigress protected samples. In the
other programs the tricks are detected and removed.
For dataset #1 and #2we are able to execute the output binary and
all the deobfuscated programs behave in a semantically equivalent
way to the obfuscated ones (RQ5). For dataset #3 the recompiled bi-
naries are not working because of some additional anti–tampering
checks in those binaries b .
For all the programs we verified the output binary obtained
by SATURN with the IDA Pro [10] decompiler. The decompiler is
returning meaningful and readable pseudo C code (RQ3). This was
failing before as IDA Pro struggles with obfuscated code.
9 DISCUSSION
We compared our work to existing LLVM based binary lifting frame-
works. All of them were failing in lifting obfuscated code ([36], [15],
[20], [14]) as they were not built for this task. A good overview of
the existing LLVM–based lifters is given in the comparison table
that can be found in [20]. One exception is S2E [6], the symbolic
execution tool based on QEMU [2]. S2E is able to export the gener-
ated traces in pure LLVM-IR form but, considering it is a dynamic
approach, we can’t compare it to our work.
We also compared our work to the symbolic execution tool Triton
[31]. We were interested to see how SATURN compares to Triton
while processing the opaque predicates with an SMT solver. We
noticed that SATURN is able to create much smaller and optimized
SMT queries due to prior optimizations. In this regard our approach
is much more efficient compared to the one in Triton and therefore
reduces the solving times5. This complies with the assumption in
[3].
The work presented in [19], although based on binary execution
traces, is a valid starting point to improve the detection of the dy-
namic opaque predicates in SATURN. While the work presented
in [3] describes a strong simplification methodology based on the
Drill&Join synthesis technique [1] which is orthogonal to the ones
in SATURN and could further improve the MBA expressions han-
dling. As discussed in Section 12, a plugin system would enable us
to integrate these approaches during the exploration phase.
10 RELATEDWORK
Machine Learning. One of the side products of SATURN is a data-
base with normalized opaque predicates and obfuscation patterns
thanks to the Redis [24] cache used in the Souper Optimizer [27]. We
think that it would be interesting to see what a machine learning
based method like the one introduced in the work of Tofighi-Shirazi
et al. [32] could make of this information to improve the opaque
5The comparison is available in the results’ repository
predicate recovery rate in SATURN.
Exploit generation. Rolles et al. described how SMT solving
can help to automatically chain together sequences of ROP gadgets,
so that the sequence is semantically equivalent to a model payload
[34]. We think that SATURN can be used to create such ROP gadgets
and, in combination with a DSE tool like KLEE [4] model the needed
sequence and payload for an exploit.
Effectiveness of Synthesis inConcolicDeobfuscation.Biondi
et al. summarize in [3] that SMT solvers alone are not efficient
enough against MBA based obfuscation. As future work they pro-
posed to study a tool that could drive the concolic execution of
obfuscated programs by retrieving a compact representation of ob-
fuscated constraints. They expect that the simplified constraints are
easier to solve or check for satisfiability. We believe that SATURN
is exactly the tool that they are looking for. It would be interesting
to study the work done in SATURN in combination with the work
in [3].
11 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed a state–of–the–art framework for
software deobfuscation based around the LLVM ecosystem. The
work implemented in the tool SATURN lifts the attack surface away
from the binary level up to the LLVM-IR and solves the problems
that appear during binary deobfuscation directly on this level. The
results that we reach are not based on any assumptions, instead we
use general optimization techniques and SMT solving to extract
the control flow graph and deobfuscate the code. The achieved opti-
mized representation can help to apply advanced practical attacks.
We believe that the presented work highlights a new perspective on
program deobfuscation and complements existing work by lifting
the attack surface to a new level.
12 FUTUREWORK
We would like to add a plugin system to let the user hook in sev-
eral phases of the code recovery in SATURN and write their own
transformation passes. This could be used to devirtualize a protec-
tion like the Tigress virtualization or handle MBA expressions with
customized approaches. Right now we are concretizing the stack
pointer to be able to retrieve the stack slots, but we think that we
could change this step to be based on a completely symbolic ap-
proach. We would also like to try out some new ideas in which we
change the type of the registers used in Remill into pointers, as this
may help to avoid IntToPtr casts in LLVM and generate cleaner code
to begin with. Right now we are only able to lift x86_64 binary code
but Remill also supports lifting of AArch64 and x86 binary code. We
are aware that a constant range analysis was recently added to the
constant synthesis in Souper [25]. We believe this could be used to
tackle the difficulties related with the identification of switch-case
destination addresses.
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